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purchaser entered into immediate possession."
The purchaser, not
the vendor, had the right to immediate possession, and is therefore
the proper party to maintain this possessory action.
J. WiuT TUR na,J&
CONFLICT

LAWS-JURISDICTION TO GRANT DIVORCEDAVIS v. DAVIS.
In 1925 H. was granted a divorce a mensa et thoro from W. In
the District of Columbia. Subsequently, H. filed a petition In the
District of Columbia to have the alimony decree granted in the separation set aside, relying mainly upon a decree of absolute divorce obtained
by him in the Circuit Court of Arlington County, Virginia, on grounds
which did not constitute grounds for divorce in the District of Columbia.
In the Virginia action W. was personally served with process in the
District of Columbia. She appeared and filed a plea stating that she
appeared "specially and for no other purpose than to file this plea
to the jurisdiction of the court." A commissioner in chancery was
appointed, and he reported that in his opinion H. was a resident of
Arlington County, Virginia, and that the court had jurisdiction to hear
and determine the case. After her exceptions to the commissioner's
report as contrary to the evidence were overruled, W. did not plead
further, and the divorce was granted. Held: Decree of the Virginia
court must be given full faith and credit by the District of Columbia.
Davis v. Davis. - U. S. -, 59 Sup. Ct. 3 (1938).
If the petitioner was actually domiciled in Virginia for the period
required by the statute in that state, the Virginia decree is valid, and
this case states the law under the "full faith and credit clause" of the
Constitution.'
Generally, it may be said that the forum which has jurisdiction to
grant divorce is the forum of the matrimonial domicil.2 However, it Is
usually held that the matrimonial domicil is separable for the purpose
of divorce.3 The old principle of the law of domestic relations that the
OF

intention of the parties. Payment of taxes and interest imply that
occupancy was expected." Sample v. Lyons, 69 N. Y. S. 378, 59 App.
Div. 456 (1901).
See Welch v. Hover Schiffner Co., 75 Wash. 130, 134
P. 526 (1913); Krakow v. Wille, 125 Wis. 284, 103 N. W. 1121 (1905).
11Krakow v. Wille, supra, n. 12. See also: Sample v. Lyons, 69
N. Y. S. 378, 59 App. Div. 456 (1901).
Art. VI, sec. 1.
2 See Goodrich on Conflict of Laws (2d ed.) Discussion sec. 123 on
"Basis of Jurisdiction for Divorce", (1938).
a Cheever v. Wilson, 9 Wall. (U. S.) 108, 19 L. Ed. 604 (1869) ; Chap
man v. Chapman, 129 Ill. 386, 21 N. D. 806 (1889); Jenness v. Jenness,
24 Ind. 355, 87 Am. Dec. 335 (1865); Sworski v. Sworski, 75 N. H. 1, 70
A. 119 (1908); Collin v. Reed, 55 Pa. 375 (1867); Craven v. Craven, 27
Wis. 418 (1871).

CASE COMMENTS
domicil of the husband is that of the wife4 has been modified, so that
now a wife may acquire a residence or domicil separate from that of
her husband for the purposes of jurisdiction in actions for divorce,5 in
cases where the husband has been guilty of wrongful conduct in the
marital relation, 6 or where the marital tie has been broken by a
separation agreement 7 The wronged spouse may acquire this separate
domicil either by retaining a home in the state or country of the previous matrimonial domicil, after the other has acquired a separate home
elsewhere,$ or by the acquisition of a new separate domicil in another
state or country.' In the instant case, the fault of the wife is shown
by the fact that a degree of divorce a mensa et thoro was granted to
the husband in the District of Columbia.
The principal difficulty presented by this decision is with relation
to the discussion of the court as to why the Virginia court had jurisdiction over the parties so that it had power to render a valid decree.
It may be said that the decision of the Virginia court as to the
husband's domicil, since it was contested, was to be regarded as res
aajudicataso that the question could not be re-litigated in a collateral
attack on the Virginia decree,2 and that, therefore, Virginia had jurisdiction over the res and the right to grant the divorce. However, as
was stated above, the respondent appeared specially in the Virginia
action. It is well settled that a special appearance for a specific pur4 Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U. S. 155, 45 L. Ed. 794 (1901) ; Anderson v. Watts, 138 U. S. 694, 34 L. Ed. 1078 (1891); Town of Watertown
v. Greaves (C. C. A. 1st.), 112 Fed. 183 (1901); Stouse v. Leipfe,
101 Ala. 433, 14 So. 667 (1897); Minick v. Minick, 111 Fla. 469, 149 So
483 (1933), Parrett v. Palmer, 8 Ind. App. 356, 35 N. E. 713 (1893);
George v. George, 190 Ky. 706, 228 S. W. 408 (1921); Re Daggett, 255
N. Y. 243, 174 N. E. 641 (1931).
See also Am. Law Inst. Restatement,
Conflict of Laws, sec. 27.
"Williamson v. Osenton, 232 U. S. 619, 58 L. Ed. 758 (1914); Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U. S. 562, 50 L. Ed. 867 (1909); Cheever v. Wilson,
9 Wall. (U. S.) 108, 19 L. Ed. 604 (1869).
'Williamson v. Osenton, supra n. 5; Haddock v. Haddock, supra
n. 5; Cheever v. Wilson, supra n. 3; Hill v. Hill, 166 Il1. 54. 46 N. E. 751
(1897); Norris v. Norris, 224 Ala. 628, 141 So. 672 (1932); Jenness v.
Jenness, supra n. 3; Hall v. Hall, 102 Ky. 297, 43 S. W. 429 (1897);
Colvin v. Reed, supra n. 3.
7
Aspinwall v. Aspinwall, 40 Nev. 55, 160 P. 253 (1916); Perrin v.
Perrin, 180 Misc. 408, 250 N. Y. S. 588 (1931).
In connection with footnotes (6) and (7), see also Am. Law Inst. Restatement, Conflict of
Laws, sec. 113, which provides that a state where one party is domiciled
has jurisdiction to grant a divorce if the spouse not domiciled in the
state, "(1) has consented that the other spouse acquire a separate home,
or (ii) by his or her misconduct has ceased to have the right to object to
the acquisition of such a separate home.
See annotation, 39 A. L. R. 711.
'Haddock v. Haddock, supra n. 5; Barber v. Barber, 21 How. (U. S.)
582, 16 L. Ed. 226 (1858); Dean v. Dean, 241 N. Y. 240, 149 N. E. 844
(1925).
"0See discussion in Comment, 6 Chicago Law Rev. 293 (1939);
Rest. Conflict of Laws §451.
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pose does not waive the service of process," but in the instant case,
no discussion of the service of process Is to be found. All that is to be
found in this connection is a rather vague discussion of the effect of the
respondent's special appearance. This is followed by a hasty, non
sequitur conclusion that the special appearance was of the same effect
as a general appearance, and in its decision (based on the general proposition that when a defendant in a divorce action voluntarily submits
himself to the jurisdiction of the court by a general appearance, the
necessity for the service of process is obviated),12 the court concludes
that a valid decree was rendered by the Virginia court.
However, despite this faulty reasoning, it is submitted that a just
result was reached in this case, for the reason that there was a sufficient
service of process to give the Virginia court jurisdiction to grant a
divorce. A divorce action is considered quasi in rem, and consequently
the Virginia Code provides for service by publication on non-residents
in divorce actions.
It has been held in Virginia that the real purpose
to be served by process is to apprise the adverse party of the nature of
the proceeding against him.1' There is also authority to the effect that
personal service outside the state of suit is equivalent to service by
publication.15 This being the law, it would seem that the Supreme
Court could have applied it to the facts of the instant case and could
in that way have reached a correct as well as just result. As the question of domicil has been litigated and decided in favor of the husband,
and since the fault of the wife was established by the decree rendered
against her in the District of Columbia, Virginia has jurisdiction over
the res, and, therefore, authority to grant the divorce if the notice
statute has been complied with. Since the respondent here was personally served in the District of Columbia, both the provisions of the
publication statute and the policy of notice in the law have been complied with, and the Virginia court had jurisdiction to grant the divorce.
PHLLIP ScOFF.
INSURANCE--"PARTICIPATING IN AERONAUTICS" IN AIRCRAFT
CLAUSE, AS APPLICABLE TO A PASSENGER.
The insured, a farmer, was killed in the crash of an airplane in
which he was a passenger. He had no control over the flight of the
plane, and was not connected with aeronautics in any business way.
The policy under which recovery for his death was sought provided:
" Bowers, Civil Process and Its Service, sec. 19, et seq. (1927).
"In re Austin's Estate, 173 Mich. 47, 138 N. W. 237 (1912); Freeman v. Freeman, 126 App. Div. 601, 110 N. Y. S. 686 (1908).
However,
the general rule is that there can be no waiver by appearance where
neither party is domiciled in the state of the forum. Cheever v. Wilson,
supra n. 3; Lister v. Lister, 88 N. J. Eq. 30, 97 Atl. 170. Some courts
refuse to recognize any voluntary appearance whatever: Gondas v.
Gondas, (N. 3. Eq.) 134 Atl. 615 (1926).
"Va. Code 1930, see. 6042.
2" Scott v. Scott, 142 Va. 31, 128 S. E. 599 (1925).
Is Bowers, op. cit., sec. 295, 296.

